文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Stochastic stability of evolutionary prisoner's dilemma

作者：Liang, Haili[1]; Zhou, Zhao[2]; Zhang, Fan[3]; Peng, Chen[1]; Wang, Yu-Long[1]

机构：[1] Shanghai Key Laboratory of Power Station Automation Technology, School of Mechatronic Engineering and Automation, Shanghai University, Shanghai, 200444, China; [2] Key Laboratory of Advanced Control and Optimization for Chemical Processes, Ministry of Education, East China University of Science and Technology, Shanghai, 200237, China; [3] State Key Laboratory of Intelligent Control and Decision of Complex Systems, School of Mathematics, Southeast University, Nanjing, China

年份：2018

起止页码：1

外文期刊名：ANZCC 2018 - 2018 Australian and New Zealand Control Conference

收录：EI(收录号：20191006598454)

语种：英文

外文关键词：Graph theory - Cost benefit analysis - Game theory

摘要：In this paper, we study two-player evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on regular graphs and identify the stochastically stable equilibria for infinite populations. We consider four different update rules: Birth-death(BD), death-birth(DB), imitation(IM) and pairwise comparison(PC). With the same values of cost and benefit of cooperation, we show that there is a unique stochastically stable equilibrium for evolutionary prisoner's dilemma on regular graphs. If the benefit-to-cost ratio is larger than k + 2 (k is the degree of a regular graph), the networked game has a higher fraction of cooperators than that for a well-mixed population. Under certain conditions, the lower graph connectivity can lead to the emergence of more cooperators. Besides theoretical analysis, we demonstrate our results through numerical computations and simulations as well. ? 2018 IEEE.