文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：在线健康咨询市场中的价格溢价研究

英文题名：Price Premiums in the Online Health Consultation Market

作者：李嘉[1];唐洁[1];蒋玲[1];陈晋[1];刘璇[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

年份：2018

卷号：31

期号：1

起止页码：15

中文期刊名：管理科学

外文期刊名：Journal of Management Science

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2017】；社科基金资助期刊;CSSCI:【CSSCI2017_2018】；

基金：国家自然科学基金(71371005;71471064;91646205;71421002)

语种：中文

中文关键词：电子健康;健康咨询;价格溢价;信号理论;不确定性

外文关键词：e-health;health consultation;price premium;signaling theory;uncertainty

摘要：在线健康咨询服务是电子健康领域一个新兴的应用,对于减少医疗成本、提高医疗服务质量和公平性具有重要的意义。平台的繁荣离不开医生的持续参与,而获得满意的金钱回报是医生持续参与的一个重要原因。因此,研究在线健康咨询市场中的价格溢价对医生、平台和病人都具有重要意义。从信息不对称的视角考察在线健康咨询市场中的价格溢价问题,根据在线健康咨询市场的特点提出地位和声誉两种重要的信号机制;从不确定性角度出发,识别出在线服务年限、疾病隐私程度和疾病严重程度3个对信号机制产生调节作用的重要变量;针对糖尿病、胰腺癌、小儿肺炎和不孕不育4种疾病,从好大夫网上连续收集5个月所有医生的相关信息,验证研究模型和假设。研究结果表明,地位和声誉对价格溢价均有显著的正向影响。随着医生在线服务年限的增加,地位对获取价格溢价的作用逐渐下降;当用户咨询隐私类疾病时会更加关注医生的声誉,因而愿意向高声誉的医生支付更高的服务费用;当疾病严重程度较高时,用户面临巨大风险,更愿意去线下的大医院当面就诊。由于对平台的不信任导致需求萎缩,因而即使是有非常高声誉的医生,也难以在线上获得更高的价格溢价。研究结果为在线健康咨询平台上的医生、用户和平台运营商提供若干指导,有助于提供健康咨询服务的医生理解如何获得更高的价格溢价,有助于用户用合理的价格选择合适的医生,有助于平台服务商留住医生(尤其是好医生),促进平台的繁荣。
Online health consultation service is a new application area of e - health, which has great potential in reducing the medical cost as well as increasing the service quality and service fairness. The success of platform depends on the continuous par- ticipation of physicians, and the economic return is a major reason for physicians to provide online services. Therefore, under- standing the price premiums in the online health consultation market is of some significance for the physicians, the platform man- agers and the users. In this study, from the information asymmetry perspective and drawing on sigrmling theory, we investigate the antecedents of doctors＇ price premium in the online health consultation market. Specifically, we propose status and reputation as two types of signals that convey information of doctors to consumers. Furthermore, we identify three important variables that indicate uncer- tainties in such a context： doctors＇ homepage age, disease privacy and disease severity. We posit that these three indicators of uncertainties will moderate the signaling effect of status and reputation on price premium. To test our research hypothesis, panel data of four diseases （ i. e. , diabetes, cancer of pancreas, infantile pneumonia and infertility） were collected from haodf, com for five months. The results indicate that both status and reputation have positive effects on price premium. The results also show that as a doctor＇s homepage age increases, the impact of status on price premium will be alleviated. Moreover, when consumers consult for a disease higher in privacy concerns, they will pay more attention to a doctor＇s reputation, and subsequently the positive effect of reputation on price premium will be strengthened. In contrast, when the disease severity is high, the users face great risks and therefore are more willing to see doctors in the offline hospitals. The distrust to the platform leads to the decrease of online service demand. Therefore, even the physicians with high reputation are difficult to the high price premium. This research has some implications for the physicians, platform managers and users. For the online physicians, the study helps to understand how to get the higher price premium to gain more economic return. For the online users, this study helps to choose the appropriate physicians with the good price. For the platform managers, this study helps to retain the physicians （espe-cially the good physicians） to promote platform prosperity. For example, if the platform manager intends to retain the some physi- cians, she should help them collect more user feedbacks through policy and system design. For the physicians in weak situations （ e. g. , the physicians who specialize on the high severity diseases）, the platfol^n should provide them allowances to keep them at a good price premium.