文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：环境维权群体性事件的博弈路径及对策分析

英文题名：On the Game and Countermeasure of Environment Rights Group Incidents

作者：刘晓亮[1];蒋薇[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学社会与公共管理学院,上海200237

年份：2013

卷号：28

期号：1

起止页码：89

中文期刊名：华东理工大学学报（社会科学版）

外文期刊名：Journal of East China University of Science and Technology：Social Science Edition

收录：;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;CSSCI:【CSSCI2012_2013】；

基金：上海市教育委员会科研创新项目(13ZS039);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(WE1123001);国家社会科学基金重点项目(12ASH001)

语种：中文

中文关键词：环境维权群体性事件;隐性利益同盟;博弈

外文关键词：environmental right group incidents, hidden benefit league, game

摘要：中国由环境问题引发的群体性事件正在逐年增多。环境维权群体性事件包含潜伏、诱发、准备、高潮和恢复五个阶段。企业、政府及公众是环境维权群体性事件中平行的三方博弈主体,但企业和政府却结成隐性利益同盟,与公众在各阶段展开博弈。应从公共决策、项目建设、环境监督、公众维权、媒体舆论等方面采取措施,减少或避免环境维权群体性事件的发生。
China＇s group incidents caused by environmental problems are increased year by year. Environmental fight group incidents contain latent stage, inductive stage, preparation stage, climax stage and recovery stage. Enterprise, the government and the public are parallel game subjects, but the enterprise and government have formed implicit interest alliance and play game with the public at every stage. In order to avoid or reduce the environmental rights group events, measures must be taken from public decision-making, project construction, environmental supervision, public rights, media debate, etc.