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政策抗争中地方政府风险收益与回应选择逻辑研究——基于三个地方政策抗争案例的比较分析    

Analysis on Local Government’s Risk Return and Selective Response in Policy Resistance——Based on Comparative Cases Analysis of Three Local Policy Resistances

文献类型:期刊文献

中文题名:政策抗争中地方政府风险收益与回应选择逻辑研究——基于三个地方政策抗争案例的比较分析

英文题名:Analysis on Local Government’s Risk Return and Selective Response in Policy Resistance——Based on Comparative Cases Analysis of Three Local Policy Resistances

作者:李琼[1];吴姿怡[1]

机构:[1]华东理工大学社会与公共管理学院

年份:2019

卷号:16

期号:3

起止页码:27

中文期刊名:公共管理学报

外文期刊名:Journal of Public Management

收录:国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2017】;CSSCI:【CSSCI2019_2020】;

基金:国家社科基金重大项目(16ZDA083)

语种:中文

中文关键词:政策抗争;地方政府;选择性回应

外文关键词:Policy Resistance;Local Government;Selective Response

摘要:在新旧矛盾挤压下展开的现代化转型过程中,频发的地方政策抗争行动对我国现代回应型政府的建设提出了新的挑战。面对"政策目标"和"社会稳定"之间的张力,地方政府在政策抗争中的回应选择显得尤为关键。基于20则政策抗争事件组成的案例库,本研究运用混合定性法,以地方政府政策风险收益——"官民诉求契合度"、"问责风险规避度"和"政策抗争团结度"三个关键因素构建地方政府选择性回应三维模型,并选取三个典型案例深入比较分析地方政府回应选择的内在逻辑——"话语型低度回应"、"政策调整型中度回应"、"政策变革型高度回应"。研究发现,地方政府在理性政治经济人属性支配下,在政策抗争中始终围绕"政策风险收益"展开多方博弈,其最终采取的差异化回应策略还会受其对政策抗争的认知能力、反应能力和处置能力约束。本文是对地方政府政策抗争差异化回应选择及其行动逻辑的初步探索,对现代回应型政府的转型建设具有理论和实践意义,其局限性在于受政策抗争"偶发性"这一特性的限制,研究案例的结构化程度有待提高。
In the process of modernization transformation with pressure from old and new contradictions, fre-quent local policy resistances have indicated, that there are new challenges for construction of modern responsive government in China. Faced with tension between "policy objectives" and "social stability", local governments’ selective response in policy resistances is particularly critical. Based on 20 policy protest events, it used mixed qualitative research method, and devised a three-dimensional model of local government selective response from perspective of policy risk return, namely "consistence of government and people’s appeals","aversion of risk and accountability" and "unity of policy resistance". It compared three typical resistance cases and analyzed local government’s responsive choices with internal logic in policy resistance, including "low response by discourse","moderate response by policy adjustment" and "high response by policy change". It is found that, with nature of rational political and economic man, local governments play interest games around "risk and return" in policy resistance, and their ultimate responsive strategy will also be constrained by their cognitive, responsive and disposal abilities. It is a preliminary exploration of local governments’ selective response and action logic in policy resistances, and has theoretical and practical significance for modern responsive government transformation. The limitation is, due to the restriction of "incidental" characteristic of policy resistances, the research cases’ structural degree needs to be further improved.

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