文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：车险市场价格竞争的博弈分析——基于费率市场化改革背景

英文题名：Game Theory Analysis on the Auto Insurance Market′s Price Competition——Based on the Background of Market-oriented Reform in Auto Insurance Rate

作者：崔惠贤[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院金融系,上海200237

年份：2012

期号：6

起止页码：39

中文期刊名：保险研究

外文期刊名：Insurance Studies

收录：;北大核心:【北大核心2011】；CSSCI:【CSSCI_E2012_2013】；

基金：教育部人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(09YJC630075)

语种：中文

中文关键词：车险费率市场化;竞争效应;博弈分析

外文关键词：market-orientation in auto insurance rates ; competition effects ;game theory analysisr

摘要：车险是我国最早开始市场化改革的险种。2001年开始的费率改革引发了车险市场的一系列竞争效应。通过构建不同的博弈模型进行分析,结果表明:追求保费收入最大化是保险公司陷入非理性竞争的根源;车险营销的"强代理"模式加剧了这种恶性竞争;在监管力量短期内难以增加的情况下,依然停留在对费率本身的监管不利于车险的市场化改革。
Auto insurance rate reform was launched the earliest in the insurance market. The reform, which was initiated in 2001 ,triggered a series of competitive effects. By constructing different game models, we can find that the source of irrational competition between insurance companies is the pursuit of premium revenue maximization. The ＂strong-agent＂ model in auto insurance marketing has exacerbated this vicious competition. Given that regulation cannot be strengthened in short term, it may undermine the market-oriented reform on the auto insurance if the focus of regulation remains targeted at the pricing rate itself.