文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Colluding with a conscience

作者：Santore, Rudy[1];Li, Youping[2];Cotten, Stephen J.[3]

机构：[1]Univ Tennessee, Dept Econ, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA;[2]E China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[3]Univ Houston, Dept Econ & Finance, Houston, TX 77058 USA

年份：2015

卷号：114

期号：3

起止页码：255

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000351242900003)】；

语种：英文

外文关键词：Collusion; Antitrust policy; Behavioral economics; Incentive compensation

摘要：Other-regarding preferences have been documented in many strategic settings. We provide a model in which the managers of firms in an oligopoly have preferences for both consumer welfare and own income. We find that profit sharing can function as a facilitating practice. Managers must receive a sufficiently large share of profits for collusion to be sustained, and the optimal collusive price increases with the degree of profit sharing. Thus, restrictions on performance-based compensation may be consistent with the objectives of antitrust policy. We also find that an increase in industry concentration can harm consumers even if the firms were already successfully colluding.