文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Inventory Management Under Power Structures With Consignment Contract Subject to Inventory Inaccuracy

作者：Tao, Feng[1];Fan, Tijun[1];Lai, Kin Keung[2]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Management Sci & Engn, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[2]Shenzhen Univ, Coll Econ, Shenzhen 518060, Guangdong, Peoples R China

年份：2019

卷号：66

期号：4

起止页码：763

外文期刊名：IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT

收录：;EI(收录号：20182905558738);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000501550600021)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000501550600021)】；

基金：LThis work was supported in part by the Shanghai Pujiang Program under Grant 18PJC025, in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 71201059, Grant 71431004, and Grant 71772063, and in part by the Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai under Grant 18ZR1409400.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Supply chains; Contracts; Inventory management; Analytical models; Fans; Lead; Decision analysis; game theory; inventory management; optimization; supply chain management

摘要：This paper focuses on who should control the inventory and who should lead the supply chain under consignment contract. The supply chain consists of one supplier and one retailer, and inventory inaccuracy occurs on the retailers side. Vendor-managed inventory (VMI) and retailer-managed inventory (RMI) models are analyzed in two different supply chain power structures: where the supplier is the Stackelberg leader (referred as SVMI and SRMI) and where the retailer is the Stackelberg leader (referred as RVMI and RRMI). The inventory availability and the channel cost sharing rate are examined to investigate the impact of these two factors on supply chain performance under four cases. It is important to find that whatever the values of the inventory availability and the channel cost sharing rate may be, the retailer always prefers SVMI. However, there is a threshold value of inventory availability (channel cost sharing rate) such that the supplier prefers SVMI only if the inventory availability (channel cost sharing rate) is larger (less) than the threshold value; and it prefers RRMI only if the inventory availability (channel cost sharing rate) is less (larger) than the threshold value. Therefore, both leading retailer and leading supplier have the incentive to act as the follower.