文献类型：会议论文

英文题名：Monitoring: When Institutional Investors Do?

作者：Tang, Songlian[1]

机构：[1]E China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

会议论文集：International Conference on Public Economics and Management (ICPEM2009)

会议日期：NOV 28-29, 2009

会议地点：Xiamen, PEOPLES R CHINA

语种：英文

外文关键词：institutional investor; corporate governance; repeated game

摘要：We use a repeated game model to analysis when the institutional investors take "monitoring" action in corporate governance. The repeated game indicated that the higher percent and longer holding period of institutional, the greater possibility of institutional investors take "monitoring" action. It induce that the stockholding proportion and their holding period of institutional investors depend the cost-benefit framework of their monitoring on game theory. To the best knowledge; this is the first paper to study the role of China's institutional investors in corporate governance, simultaneously, from their stockholding proportion and their holding period.