文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Enterprises' bargaining power, supervision by public opinion, and environmental regulations: Evidence from the pollutant discharge permit system of China

作者：Feng, Jingbing[1];Shao, Shuai[2,3];Wu, Hao[4,5]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[2]Tongji Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Shanghai 200092, Peoples R China;[3]Lab High Qual Urban Dev & Strateg Decis, Shanghai 200092, Peoples R China;[4]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Social & Publ Adm, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[5]East China Univ Sci & Technol, New Era Natl Secur Res Ctr, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2026

卷号：103

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF ASIAN ECONOMICS

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:001683126100001)】；

基金：We acknowledge the financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 72573116 and 72243004) , the National Social Science Foundation of China (No. 25VRC038) , and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Enterprises' bargaining power; Supervision by public opinion; Environmental regulations; Pollutant discharge permit; Environmental information disclosure; China

摘要：Enterprises face various levels of environmental regulation intensity due to the discretion of local governments, which affects the outcome of environmental regulation policy. However, few studies have specifically discussed how informal environmental regulations, represented by public opinion supervision, can correct the above phenomenon. On the basis of data on China's pollutant discharge permits from 2017 to 2019, this paper directly characterizes environmental regulations at the micro enterprise level and uses the truncated regression method to empirically investigate the weakening effect of enterprises' bargaining power on environmental regulations and how supervision by public opinion can correct it. The results show that the greater the bargaining power is, the lower the level of environmental regulations are. Further analysis reveals that a higher level of supervision by public opinion, i.e., higher degrees of environmental information disclosure and media concern over environmental issues, can decrease the weakening effect of enterprises' bargaining power on environmental regulations. The effective role of public opinion relies on institutional conditions, such as superior supervision and the financial status of local governments. This study adds to the literature by providing the empirical evidence of the spatial differences in environmental regulations and the relationship between formal and informal environmental regulations at the micro level, serving as an important decision-making reference for optimizing environmental governance strategies.