文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：With whom to ally? Alliance strategy for EV battery supplier considering echelon utilization and disassembly recycling

作者：Fang, Zhangzhen[1];Guo, Yuhan[1];Lou, Gaoxiang[1];Lai, Zhixuan[2];Ma, Haicheng[3,4];Zhou, Li[5]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Business Sch, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[2]Shanghai Lixin Univ Accounting & Finance, Sch Financial Technol, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[3]Beijing Inst Technol, Ctr Energy & Environm Policy Res, Beijing, Peoples R China;[4]Beijing Inst Technol, Sch Management, Beijing, Peoples R China;[5]Univ Greenwich, Business Sch, London, England

年份：2026

卷号：208

外文期刊名：TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH PART E-LOGISTICS AND TRANSPORTATION REVIEW

收录：;EI(收录号：20260419957040);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:001667571900001)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001667571900001)】；

基金：This research has received funding from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72474069, No. 72403023, No. 72032001) , Postdoctoral Fellowship Program of CPSF (No.Postdoctoral Fellowship ProgramGZC20242170) , Shanghai Sailing Program (No. 23YF1430000) , the Humanities and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of the People's Republic of China (No.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Battery recycling; Echelon utilization; Disassembly recycling; Closed-loop supply chain; Alliance strategy; Technological innovation

摘要：The rapid expansion of the electric vehicle (EV) industry has heightened the need for sustainable and efficient closed-loop supply chains (CLSC) that can simultaneously improve economic returns and mitigate environmental impacts. To address this challenge, this study develops a game-theoretic model from the perspective of the power battery supplier and examines four inter-firm alliance modes: Non-alliance (N), supplier-manufacturer alliance (SM), supplier-recycler alliance (SR), and comprehensive alliance (SMR). The results reveal that (1) in the forward supply chain, suppliers under the SM and SMR modes consistently achieve higher battery capacity and EV sales. In the reverse supply chain, suppliers in alliance modes (SM, SR, SMR) are able to pay lower recycling prices while securing higher recycling quantities. (2) When recycling competition is weak, alliance with the manufacturer improves economic performance, whereas that with the recycler enhances environmental outcomes; however, the two benefits cannot be achieved simultaneously. By contrast, under intense recycling competition, forming a comprehensive alliance allows suppliers to improve both environmental and economic performance. (3) When extending the analysis to include suppliers' investment in echelon utilization technology innovation, increased recycling competition intensity leads to a decline in the supplier's echelon utilization performance, thereby amplifying the advantage of the comprehensive alliance.