文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：New axioms for top trading cycles

作者：Chen, Siwei[1];Chen, Yajing[2,4];Hsu, Chia-Ling[3]

机构：[1]Sun Yat sen Univ, Lingnan Coll, Guangzhou, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[3]Natl Sun Yat sen Univ, Inst Econ, Kaohsiung, Taiwan;[4]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2023

卷号：75

期号：4

起止页码：1064

外文期刊名：BULLETIN OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000961326200001)】；

基金：ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The first draft of this paper was finished in 2013. We are grateful to Zhenhua Jiao, Bettina Klaus, Peng Liu, Qianfeng Tang, William Thomson, and participants at the 2020 Interdisciplinary Forum of Game Theory and Economic Management for helpful comments and discussions. Yajing Chen's research is supported by The National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72273043). Siwei Chen's research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71801230) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. 20wkpy43).

语种：英文

外文关键词：characterization; mutual best group quota-rationality; mutual best group robust efficiency; top trading cycles mechanism

摘要：The school choice problem is of great importance both in theory and practice. This paper studies the (student-optimal) top trading cycles mechanism (TTCM) in an axiomatic way. We introduce two new axioms: MBG (mutual best group)-quota-rationality and MBG-robust efficiency. While stability implies MBG-quota rationality, MBG-robust efficiency is weaker than robust efficiency, which is stronger than the combination of efficiency and group strategy proofness. The TTCM is characterized by MBG-quota rationality and MBG-robust efficiency. Our results construct a new basis to compare the TTCM with the other school choice mechanisms, in terms of both fairness and incentive-related axioms.