文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：国有企业混合所有制改革能降低费用粘性吗?

英文题名：Can Mixed-ownership Reform Decrease SOEs’Cost Stickiness?

作者：葛永盛[1];宋晓芳[1];雷英[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

年份：2022

卷号：33

期号：2

起止页码：97

中文期刊名：财贸研究

外文期刊名：Finance and Trade Research

收录：国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2020】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2021_2022】；

基金：国家自然科学基金青年项目“公开上市对企业创新活动的影响研究”(71502060);上海市哲学社会科学规划课题“科创板上市公司对创新活动进行信息披露的动机研究”(2020BGL040)。

语种：中文

中文关键词：混合所有制改革;费用粘性;国有企业;非国有股东

外文关键词：mixed-ownership reform;cost stickiness;state-owned enterprises;non-state shareholder

摘要：以2007—2018年A股制造业上市公司为样本,探究混合所有制改革对国有企业成本管理行为的影响。结果表明,国有企业混合所有制改革程度越深,费用粘性程度越低,且董事会权力类变量的效果更明显。非国有股东的治理作用在管理层自利程度高、政策性负担重的国有企业中更为显著。进一步分析发现,相比于特定功能类国有企业,非国有股东治理效果在充分竞争类国有企业中更为显著;相比于民营股东,外资股东治理作用更强。
Taking A-share manufacturing listed companies from 2007 to 2018 as samples,this paper explores the impact of mixed ownership reform on cost management behavior of SOEs.The results show that the deeper the mixed reform of SOEs,the lower the degree of expense stickiness,and the effect of variables like board of directors’power is more obvious.The governance role of non-state-owned shareholders is more significant in SOEs with high management self-interest and heavy policy burden.Further analysis shows that,compared with SOEs with specific functions,the governance effect of non-state-owned shareholders is more significant in SOEs with full competition.Compared with private shareholders,foreign shareholders have a stronger governance role.