文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：The Acquisition of Quality Information in a Supply Chain with Voluntary vs. Mandatory Disclosure

作者：Cao, Huan[1];Guan, Xu[2];Fan, Tijun[1];Zhou, Li[3]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[2]Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430072, Hubei, Peoples R China;[3]Univ Greenwich, Dept Syst Management & Strategy, London SE10 9LS, England

年份：2020

卷号：29

期号：3

起止页码：595

外文期刊名：PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000496552600001)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000496552600001)】；

基金：The authors sincerely thank the department editor Albert Ha, the senior editor, and three reviewers for their helpful comments and constructive suggestions. This research is supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71431004, 71922010, 71972071, 71871167, 71821001). Huan Cao is also partially supported by the China Scholarship Council (No. 201806740059).

语种：英文

外文关键词：quality; information acquisition; voluntary disclosure; mandatory disclosure; supply chain; game theory

摘要：Quality information acquisition and disclosure have significant ramifications for supply chain members. This study investigates the interaction between a manufacturer's product quality information acquisition and different product quality information disclosure systems in a supply chain wherein the manufacturer can privately acquire the precise quality information of its product by affordable means initially. We consider two different quality information disclosure systems for the quality information acquisition: voluntary disclosure (i.e., the manufacturer determines whether to disclose the quality information that he has acquired), and mandatory disclosure (i.e., the manufacturer is mandated to disclose the quality information that he has acquired). We examine the effects of voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure on the equilibrium strategies and payoffs of the manufacturer and the retailer and on the consumer surplus. It is shown that mandatory disclosure significantly reduces the manufacturer's incentive to acquire the precise product quality information and leads to a reduction in the product quality information that the retailer and the consumers can receive. Interestingly, although the manufacturer is ex ante better off, the retailer's ex ante payoff and the expected consumer surplus become lower under mandatory disclosure, as opposed to voluntary disclosure of product quality information.