文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：规制俘获与规制权力分离理论述评

英文题名：A Survey on the Theory of Regulatory Capture and Separation of Regulators

作者：于立宏[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,教授200237

年份：2009

期号：6

起止页码：61

中文期刊名：江苏社会科学

外文期刊名：Jiangsu Social Sciences

收录：人大复印报刊资料;CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2008】；社科基金资助期刊;CSSCI:【CSSCI2008_2009】；

基金：国家自然科学基金项目(中国煤电产业链规制方案研究-目标与路径选择;70673119)资助

语种：中文

中文关键词：规制;规制机构设计;规制分离理论;多规制者激励理论

外文关键词：regulation; design of regulatory agency; the theory of separation of regulators; the theory of motivation of multiple regulators;

摘要：政府规制的本意是消除市场失灵,保护公共利益。但由于规制机构本身存在的利益驱动,他们完全有可能被产业俘获。为了防止俘获,政府机构设置具有规制权力分离的性质,这种设置被作为防止俘获与合谋的机制。本文总结了近二十年来在新规制经济学框架中发展起来的规制俘获理论以及防止俘获的规制分离理论,并提供了大量实证研究的成果。
The original object of government regulation is to eliminate market failure and protect public interest, but the regulation agency may be captured by industries because their private interests. To avoid capture, the settlement of government organization has the nature of multiple regulators as a capture-proof mechanism. This paper summarizes the theory of regulatory capture and the separation of regulators developed in the framework of new regulation economics in last twenty years, and provides substantial achievements of some empirical studies.