文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：The strategic matching between manufacturers and streamers in live-streaming e-commerce

作者：Xin, Yucheng[1];Fan, Tijun[1,2];Xia, Haiyang[1,2]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Res Ctr Operat & Supply Chain Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China

年份：2026

起止页码：1.0

外文期刊名：INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT & DATA SYSTEMS

收录：;Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-105047893799);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001817421900001)】；

基金：This work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (award number: 72442009) and National Social Science Fund of China (award number: 23VRC051).

语种：英文

外文关键词：Live-streaming; Game theory; Pricing strategy

摘要：Purpose-This paper investigates how manufacturers with different market bases should strategically match with a high- or low-influence streamer in live-streaming e-commerce. It aims to reveal how horizontal asymmetry in market size and vertical asymmetry in pricing power jointly shape optimal cooperation strategies and profit outcomes. Design/methodology/approach-A game-theoretic model is developed featuring two asymmetric manufacturers choosing between two types of streamers. Four cooperation scenarios are analyzed under a two-stage game structure, where the pricing party differs based on streamer influence. Closed-form equilibrium are derived under linear demand. Optimal prices and profits are compared across different scenarios. Findings-Our analysis shows that the equilibrium price when cooperating with a high-influence streamer is higher than the price when cooperating with a low-influence streamer. Moreover, the large manufacturer does not always charge higher than the small manufacturer. Manufacturers' strategic cooperation choices depend on the commission rate of the high-influence streamer and the relative influence gap between the two streamers. When the rate is low and the gap is large, both manufacturers prefer the high-influence streamer. As the commission rate increases or the influence gap narrows, manufacturers begin to shift to the low-influence streamer based on cost-benefit trade-offs. Originality/value-This study offers a novel framework integrating dual asymmetries (market base and pricing power) into the live-streaming supply chain literature. It provides strategic insights for manufacturers on effective streamer collaboration and pricing delegation in digital retail environments.