文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Parameter-Estimate-First False Data Injection Attacks in AC State Estimation Deployed With Moving Target Defense

作者：Liu, Chensheng[1];Li, Yuanqi[1];Zhu, Hongcheng[1];Tang, Yang[1];Du, Wenli[1]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Key Lab Smart Mfg Energy Chem Proc, Minist Educ, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2024

卷号：71

期号：4

起止页码：1842

外文期刊名：IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON CIRCUITS AND SYSTEMS I-REGULAR PAPERS

收录：;EI(收录号：20240415430544);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001170652900001)】；

基金：No Statement Available

语种：英文

外文关键词：Moving target defense; AC state estimation; parameter-estimate-first attack

摘要：Enabled by the widely deployed distributed flexible alternating current transmission system (D-FACTS) devices in practical systems, moving target defense (MTD) has been considered as an effective way to detect stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks by actively changing branch parameters. However, existing MTD methods heavily depend on the assumption that opponents can not timely obtain the newly changed branch parameters. In this paper, a parameter-estimate-first FDI (PEF-FDI) attack is proposed to reveal vulnerabilities of MTD methods in AC state estimation, which can bypass bad data detectors in the existence of MTD. Specifically, a PEF-FDI attack model is proposed to timely construct attack vector and stealthily misguide the results of alternating current (AC) state estimation in the presence of MTD. Requirements of constructing PEF-FDI attacks on eavesdropped measurements are deduced to reveal the limitation on capability of attackers. Simulations in the IEEE 118-bus system verify the performance of the proposed PEF-FDI attacks.