文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：考虑风险偏好的生鲜农产品供应链激励契约设计

英文题名：Design of incentive contract for fresh agricultural products supply chain considering risk preference

作者：郑琪[1];范体军[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

年份：2018

卷号：32

期号：2

起止页码：171

中文期刊名：管理工程学报

外文期刊名：Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2017】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2017_2018】；CSCD:【CSCD2017_2018】；

基金：教育部新世纪人才计划资助项目(NCET-11-0637);国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(71431004);国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(71171082;71202052)

语种：中文

中文关键词：生鲜农产品;新鲜度;供应链;风险偏好程度;激励契约

外文关键词：Fresh agricultural products;Freshness;Supply chain;Risk preference;Incentive contract

摘要：针对生鲜农产品"农超对接"模式中的信息不对称,采用委托代理理论建立了生鲜农产品供应链激励契约的数学模型。结合生鲜农产品流通过程产生巨大损耗的特性,研究了生鲜农产品新鲜度和风险偏好程度对供应链利润的影响,并探讨了生鲜农产品投入质量安全科技因素前后供应链利润的变动趋势。结果表明:生鲜农产品供应链各主体的利润随着新鲜度的减小而减少,随着风险偏好程度的增大而呈现先减少后增加的趋势;考虑生鲜农产品质量安全科技投入激励契约后,超市、生鲜农产品生产商以及供应链总利润都在不同程度上有所提高。最后通过算例分析对结论进行了验证。
Fresh agricultural product is an important part of modern agriculture.The operation of the supply chain is related to the improvement of people's living standard.However,due to the perishable nature of the fresh agricultural products,and its diversified and complex operation patterns,especially the issue of information asymmetry and their different risk preferences among the main supply chain members in different operation modes,the loss rate of fresh agricultural products in the supply chain operation is high.Currently,"farming-supermarket"docking has many disadvantage,such as stabilizing the price of fresh products,reducing intermediate links in circulation,protecting the supply chain benefit of each main member and promoting food safety and others.More and more fresh products supply chains are using this model.Therefore,there is an urgent need to study the supply chain coordination of asymmetric information and risk preference in"farming-supermarket"docking model,in order to improve the circulation efficiency of fresh agricultural products and reduce the loss rate.This paper considers asymmetric information of farmer and supermarket in the supply chain of fresh agricultural products,and the supply chain system consisting of one fresh product supplier and one retailer.The principal-agent theory is used to establish the problem of both participates having different target functions,and a mathematics model of incentive contract for fresh agricultural products supply chain.This paper investigates how product freshness impacts profit of fresh agricultural products supply chain after considering all the features of fresh agricultural products,such as seasonal and periodic production,a huge loss in circulation,the limited time in consumption,and safety of the product in quality.At the same time,different risk preference and the operational mode of fresh agricultural products supply chain make great differences.Therefore,the effect of risk preference on fresh product supply chain’s profit is studied.However,fresh agricultural products supply chains are facing the increasingly serious quality and safety problem on fresh agricultural products,and the insufficient investment of science and technology in the area.Increasing investment of science and technology on fresh agricultural products can greatly improve the quality and safety of fresh products.This paper researches the incentive contract by considering the changing trend of supply chain’s profit and the investment of quality and safety in science and technology.There are four primary research results.First,the fresh agricultural products supply chain can achieve Pareto optimality by adopting incentive contract mechanism.The supermarket has the only optimal effort level and the optimal amount of ingredients.Fresh agricultural products supplier also has only one optimal divided share and the optimal fixed income decision for the supermarket.The two participates maximize their own expected profit.Second,the profit of the fresh agricultural products supply chain under complete information is higher than the profit of that under incomplete information.In another word,improving the degree of information sharing can achieve the coordination of fresh agricultural products supply chain on the Internet information platform.Third,the profit of the fresh agricultural products supply chain decreases when product freshness reduces.When retailer’s risk preference increases,the profit falls firstly,and then grow.Fourth,the retailer’s profit,the supplier’s profit,and total profit in fresh agricultural products supply chain are improved in varying degrees after quality and safety in science and technology are invested in the incentive contract.It can be seen that the investment of quality and safety in agricultural products supply chain has a good role in the optimization of the supply chain.Finally,the conclusions are verified by numerical analysis.