文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：A generalized public goods game with coupling of individual ability and project benefit

作者：Zhong, Li-Xin[1];Xu, Wen-Juan[2];He, Yun-Xin[1];Zhong, Chen-Yang[3,4];Chen, Rong-Da[1];Qiu, Tian[5];Shi, Yong-Dong[6];Ren, Fei[7,8]

机构：[1]Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, Ctr Wealth Management & Quantitat Investment, Sch Finance & Coordinated Innovat, Hangzhou 310018, Zhejiang, Peoples R China;[2]Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Law, Hangzhou 310018, Zhejiang, Peoples R China;[3]Stanford Univ, Dept Stat, Stanford, CA 94305 USA;[4]Peking Univ, Yuanpei Coll, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China;[5]Nanchang Hangkong Univ, Sch Informat Engn, Nanchang 330063, Jiangxi, Peoples R China;[6]Dongbei Univ Finance & Econ, Res Ctr Appl Finance, Dalian 116025, Peoples R China;[7]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[8]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Res Ctr Econophys, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2017

卷号：101

起止页码：73

外文期刊名：CHAOS SOLITONS & FRACTALS

收录：;EI(收录号：20172103693685);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000404700100009)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000404700100009)】；

基金：This work is the research fruits of National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 71371165, 71631005, 71273224, 71471161, 71471031, 71171036, 71202039, 61503109, 10905023, 71131007), Collegial Laboratory Project of Zhejiang Province (Grant No. YB201628), Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. LY17G030024), Research Project of Generalized Virtual Economy (Grant No. GX2015 -1004(M)), Jiangxi Provincial Young Scientist Training Project (Grant No. 2013 3BCB23017). The major project of the National Social Science Foundation of China (Grant Nos. 12&ZD067, and 14AZD089), the Program of Distinguished Professor in Liaoning Province (Grant No. [2013]204), the Project of Key Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences by Department of Education of Liaoning Province (Grant Nos. 15YJA790092, and 15YJC790041), and the Program of Discipline Support Plan in Dongbei University of Finance and Economics (Grant No. XKK-201401). The Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Public goods game; Individual ability; Project benefit; Group-size preference

摘要：Facing a heavy task, any single person can only make a limited contribution and team cooperation is needed. As one enjoys the benefit of the public goods, the potential benefits of the project are not always maximized and may be partly wasted. By incorporating individual ability and project benefit into the original public goods game, we study the coupling effect of the four parameters, the upper limit of individual contribution, the upper limit of individual benefit, the needed project cost and the upper limit of project benefit on the evolution of cooperation. Coevolving with the individual-level group size preferences, an increase in the upper limit of individual benefit promotes cooperation while an increase in the upper limit of individual contribution inhibits cooperation. The coupling of the upper limit of individual contribution and the needed project cost determines the critical point of the upper limit of project benefit, where the equilibrium frequency of cooperators reaches its highest level. Above the critical point, an increase in the upper limit of project benefit inhibits cooperation. The evolution of cooperation is closely related to the preferred group-size distribution. A functional relation between the frequency of cooperators and the dominant group size is found. (C) 2017 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.