文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Coordinating a Supply Chain When Facing Strategic Consumers

作者：Li, Tian[1];Yu, Man[2]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[2]Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Management, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

年份：2017

卷号：48

期号：2

起止页码：336

外文期刊名：DECISION SCIENCES

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000399383900005)】；

基金：The authors sincerely thank the editor-in-chief, the senior editor, the associate editor, and two reviewers for their helpful comments and constructive suggestions. Tian Li's research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71301050, 71431004) and the Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universities. Man Yu's research is supported by the Hong Kong General Research Fund (647312, 16504014).

语种：英文

外文关键词：Heterogeneous Consumers; Strategic Consumers; Supply Chain Coordination; Supply Contracts

摘要：This article examines the impact of strategic consumers on the efficiency and coordination of a supply chain. We consider a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a newsvendor retailer selling a seasonal product to strategic consumers, who may choose to wait for clearance sales to maximize their intertemporal utility. Under a prenegotiated supply contract, the retailer chooses retail price and ordering quantity simultaneously. After that, the strategic consumers, who may be heterogeneous in their patience levels, make purchasing decisions. We find that strategic consumer behavior can hurt the supply chain efficiency due to severe double marginalization, and that a simple buyback contract can coordinate the supply chain. Nevertheless, we show that the supply chain does become more difficult to coordinate when strategic consumers are present: the set of buyback contractual terms that coordinate the chain shrinks as consumers are more willing to wait, and the chain profit cannot be arbitrarily allocated between the firms. Contrary to popular intuition, this result implies that the retailer may enjoy some benefit from consumers' strategic waiting. In addition, we find that the retailer's gain is the highest when impatient and patient consumers are comparably mixed in the population.