文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：非对称信息下供应链减排投资策略及激励机制

英文题名：Supply chain's investment strategy of emission reducing and incentive mechanism design under asymmetric information

作者：楼高翔[1];张洁琼[1];范体军[1];周炜星[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

年份：2016

卷号：19

期号：2

起止页码：42

中文期刊名：管理科学学报

外文期刊名：Journal of Management Sciences in China

收录：CSTPCD;;北大核心:【北大核心2014】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2014_2016】；

基金：国家"十二五"科技支撑计划课题资助项目(2013BAH11F03);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573087;71431004;71473085;71202052);上海市浦江人才计划资助项目(15PJC020;14PJC020);中央高校基本科研业务费资助项目

语种：中文

中文关键词：减排技术投资;排放权交易;非对称信息;供应链

外文关键词：investment of emission reducing technology; carbon emission trading; asymmetric information; supply chain

摘要：来自政府和市场的低碳压力迫使企业及其所在供应链采取减排行动.由此,在允许排放权交易且消费者低碳偏好信息不对称情景下,对制造商投资减排技术的供应链激励机制设计问题展开研究.研究表明,非对称信息下,制造商可以通过供应链激励机制设计实现信息共享,但该机制并不一定能实现系统绩效最优;由于缺乏消费者低碳偏好的准确信息,制造商的利润总会小于其在对称信息下的利润,而拥有私有信息的零售商则可能获得额外收益;制造商的最优减排水平与消费者低碳偏好正相关;通过管制排放权交易价格、提供技术投入补贴等手段,政府可以激励企业投资减排技术,并达到降低碳排放总量的目的.
Greenhouse gas emissions have serious impacts on the natural environment. Considering emission trading and investment of emission reduction technology,models were presented for a two-stage supply chain to analyze the optimal investment decisions and incentive mechanism design under asymmetric consumer preference information. The results indicate that information sharing can be realized by an incentive mechanism,but such a mechanism can＇t ensure the optimal performance of the whole system. The manufacture＇s profit will be less due to the lack of accurate information about consumer preference,while the retailer with private information may gain an above-reservation profit. There is appositive correlation between the optimal percentage of emission reduction and a consumer＇s low-carbon preference. Meanwhile,the government can promote investment in emission-reduction technologies and achieve its emission reduction target by controlling emission trading prices and providing technology investment subsidies.