文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Cooperation of green R&D in supply chain with downstream competition

作者：Wu, Yifan[1];Zhang, Xuejie[1];Chen, Jing[2]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[2]Shanghai Int Studies Univ, Sch Business & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China

年份：2021

卷号：160

外文期刊名：COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING

收录：;EI(收录号：20213210730961);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000696311000004)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000696311000004)】；

基金：This study was funded in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71471062, 71431004 and 71702106), the Shanghai Pujiang Program (17PJC023, 17PJC087) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Green research and development(R&D); VerticalR&D cooperation; Spillover rate; Downstream competition

摘要：The green research and development (R&D) cooperation between supplier and manufacturer is becoming more common. This study focuses on the R&D cooperation between one common supplier and two competing manufacturers and investigates the impact of spillover rates, R&D efficiencies, competition level on the equilibrium solutions. The supplier is the Stackelberg leader, who choose to offer a cooperation proposal to one or both of the manufacturers. The manufacturers decide if they are willing to accept the cooperation independently. There are possibly four scenarios, namely, non-cooperation between the supplier and the manufacturers (C-0), the supplier cooperates with manufacturer i alone (C-i, i = 1, 2) and the supplier cooperates with both manufacturers (C1+2). Then the supplier and the manufacturers decide their investment levels simultaneously. The supplier decides the same wholesale price for both manufacturers and the manufacturers decide their selling prices. We find that the supplier's investment level increases with the technology spillover rates but the manufacturers' investment levels with respect to the technology spillover rates depend on its R&D efficiencies and the competition level. The supplier's investment level is not influenced by the manufacturers' R&D efficiencies, but its wholesale price is affected by each player's R&D efficiency. Moreover, the R&D efficiencies of manufacturers have a crucial influence on each player's cooperation preference. The supplier prefers C1+2 when both manufacturers' R&D efficiencies are high or low, otherwise, it prefers Ci. However, the manufacturers prefer Ci to C1+2. Finally, we reveal the overall equilibrium cooperation outcomes. Specially, the manufacturers will be forced to accept the supplier's proposal of C1+2 when their R&D efficiencies are relatively low. The practical implications are also discussed to provide guidelines for firms to make cooperation decisions.