文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：考虑参考效应的碳减排与低碳宣传微分博弈

英文题名：Differential Game of Carbon Abatement and Low-carbon Promotion Considering Reference Effect

作者：张永明[1];楼高翔[1];常香云[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院

年份：2018

卷号：23

期号：2

起止页码：107

中文期刊名：工业工程与管理

外文期刊名：Industrial Engineering and Management

收录：CSTPCD;;北大核心:【北大核心2017】；CSSCI:【CSSCI_E2017_2018】；

基金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71573087,71473085);上海市浦江人才计划资助项目(15PJC020);中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金资助项目

语种：中文

中文关键词：微分博弈;参考效应;减排;低碳宣传;协调

外文关键词：differential game; reference effect; carbon abatement; low-carbon promotion; coordination

摘要：针对低碳环境下由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的两级供应链，分别对有无参考效应情况下的制造商减排、零售商低碳宣传以及低碳供应链协调问题进行了研究。研究发现，集中决策下的减排和低碳宣传投入高于分散决策，且最优减排轨迹与初始减排量有关；无论有无参考效应，通过双边成本分担契约能够实现供应链的完全协调，且成本分担比例不因有无参考效应而改变；但在引入参考效应后，制造商的减排投入提升，而零售商的低碳宣传投入降低。最后，通过算例对相关参数的影响进行了分析。
Considering a dyadic channel consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, the investigation on the optimal carbon abatement, low-carbon promotion and channel coordination in the situations with and without reference effect was conducted. It shows that the decentralized equilibriums of carbon abatement and low-carbon promotion would be lower than the centralized one. Moreover, the equilibrium outcomes of carbon abatement and low-carbon promotion would decline in the presence of reference effect. In addition, it is found that the two-side way cost- sharing contract could coordinate the supply chain whether or not there is reference effect and the ratio of cost-sharing would remain the same. Finally, the impact of relevant parameters on the equilibriums was analyzed through an example.