文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：家族企业资源约束、外部投资者与合同剩余

英文题名：Resources Restriction of Family Business, Outside Investor and Contract Surplus

作者：葛永盛[1];张鹏程[2]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院会计学系;[2]中国农业银行上海分行

年份：2013

卷号：16

期号：3

起止页码：57

中文期刊名：南开管理评论

外文期刊名：Nankai Business Review

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2011】；社科基金资助期刊;CSSCI:【CSSCI2012_2013】；

基金：国家社会科学基金青年项目(10CGL002);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助

语种：中文

中文关键词：家族企业;资源约束;外部投资者;合同剩余;治理效率

外文关键词：Family Business; Resources Restriction; Outside Investor; Contract Surplus; Governance Efficiency

摘要：本文以2004-2008年我国A股家族上市公司为研究样本,采用非平衡面板数据,研究了家族企业引进外部投资者的动因,并分析了外部投资者的进入对家族企业治理效率的影响。研究表明,国内家族企业由于资源约束而引进外部投资者,但是在引进的时候会根据家族自身偏好对不同投资者而有所选择。进一步研究发现,战略投资者的引进能够长期有效地提升家族企业的治理效率,而财务投资者的引进对家族企业治理效率的影响并不显著。
Taking A-share listed family companies in China from 2004 to 2008 as a sample, the article draws on unbalanced panel data to explore the motivation and cause of family business introducing outside investors. Meanwhile, the article analyzes how the entry of outside investors influences the governance efficiency of family business. The research findings show that Chinese family businesses introduce outside investors due to the resources restriction and that their selections of outside investors are in accordance with family self-preferences. For instance, the family businesses with high extent of specialization tend to usher in strategic investors, because those family businesses are insufficient of experience in other new fields and of funds transfers of internal capital markets under the diversification. Therefore, these family businesses not only demand outside capitals but are in need of successful businesses＇ management experience and technical support in other fields. In comparison with financial investors pursuing profits, strategic investors are more instrumental in the development of family businesses with high specialization. However, our findings also demonstrate that the larger-scale family businesses tend to usher in financial investors, because these family businesses of large asset sizes possess high reputation, which can help gain high credit lines and which may be faced with more investment opportunities. Therefore, the controlling shareholders of large-scale family businesses expect to gain more capitals by means of introducing financial investors in order to satisfy their needs of investment expenditure. These family businesses are reluctant to introduce strategic investors through equity transfers, which may result in the dilution of residual right of control. The study further indicates that the introduction of strategic investors can promote the governance efficiency of family business effectively in the long run and that by contrast the introduction of financial investors exerts an unremarkable impact on the governance efficiency of family business. This regression result was verified when the problem of variable endogeneity had been solved with many diverse methods and the result underwent a relatively high robustness examination.