文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：业绩下滑、公允价值计量与高管薪酬激励

英文题名：Earnings Decrease,Fair Value Accounting and Managerial Compensation Incentive

作者：王俊秋[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,200237

年份：2013

卷号：25

期号：7

起止页码：115

中文期刊名：上海经济研究

外文期刊名：Shanghai Journal of Economics

收录：CSTPCD;;北大核心:【北大核心2011】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2012_2013】；

基金：国家自然科学基金面上项目:投资者情绪;盈余市场反应与上市公司信息披露策略(71172079)

语种：中文

中文关键词：业绩下滑;公允价值;可供出售金融资产;高管薪酬

外文关键词：Earnings Decrease ; Fair Value ; Available-for-Sale Financial Assets ; Managerial Com- pensation

摘要：本文以可供出售金融资产处置为例,实证检验了管理层择时处置可供出售金融资产的动机以及可供出售金融资产处置收益对高管薪酬契约的影响。研究发现,公允价值计量诱发了管理层的私利动机和机会主义行为,管理层通过择时处置可供出售金融资产以达到避免业绩下滑的目的;业绩下滑越严重,可供出售金融资产处置收益越高;同时,管理层从可供出售金融资产处置收益中获得了薪酬激励,尤其在业绩下滑的公司,高管薪酬对可供出售金融资产处置收益的敏感系数显著大于对其他盈余项目的敏感系数。本研究从契约有用性视角揭示了公允价值计量的经济后果,研究结果有助于强化对上市公司机会主义会计行为的监管,改善薪酬契约这一公司治理机制的有效性。
Based on the disposition of available-for-sale financial assets, this paper analyzes the motivation of managements＇ sell timing of available-for-sale financial assets and the effects of disposition gains on managerial compensation incentive by using the logistic regressions and OLS regressions. The empirical results show that the management tends to sell available-for-sale financial assets to avoid earnings decrease and the gains from disposition of available-for-sale financial assets are positive correlative with the degrees of earnings decrease. Also, the management receives compensation incentive from the dispositional gains of the available-for-sale financial assets. Further, in the firms of earnings decrease, the compensation-dispositional gains sensitivity is significantly greater than the compensation- other parts of the earnings sensitivity. This paper gives us a new perspective of the economic consequences of fair value accounting and can help governors to supervise the management＇s opportunist behaviors and enhance the efficient of compensation contract.