文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Investment Strategy of Emission-Reduction Technology in a Supply Chain

作者：Lou, Gao Xiang[1];Xia, Hai Yang[1];Zhang, Jie Qiong[1];Fan, Ti Jun[1]

机构：[1]E China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2015

卷号：7

期号：8

起止页码：10684

外文期刊名：SUSTAINABILITY

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000361600500021)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000361600500021)】；

基金：This work was financially supported by the National Key Technology R&D Program (2013BAH11F03), the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71431004, 71202052), Shanghai Pujiang Program (15PJC020), the Humanities and Social Science Youth Foundation of the Ministry of Education of China (12YJC630240) and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China.

语种：英文

外文关键词：investment of emission reduction; carbon emission trading; game theory; supply chain collaboration

摘要：Greenhouse gas emissions have serious impacts on the natural environment. Therefore, the restrictions imposed on carbon emission force enterprises to take carbon emission into consideration when making production decisions. In this paper, in the context of allowing emission trading and investment of emission reduction technology, models were presented for a two-stage supply chain to analyze the optimal investment and pricing decisions. The results indicate that manufacturer's endurance capacity of reduction difficulty is higher in the cooperation model than in the Stackelberg game model, and that perfect coordination of supply chains can be realized by a revenue sharing contract. From the perspective of a consumer, low-carbon products mean higher price, so that subsidies or tax exemptions should be provided to keep low prices. Meanwhile, the government can promote investment in emission-reduction technologies and achieve its emission reduction targets by controlling emission trading price, strengthening emission reduction publicity and providing technology investment subsidies.