文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Avoiding Real Harm but False Good: The Influence Mechanism of Political Relations on the Effectiveness of Environmental Regulation Policies

作者：He, Bin[1];Qi, Mengzhen[2];Wang, Ning[3];Zhang, Zhenhua[4]

机构：[1]Tsinghua Univ, Sch Publ Policy & Management, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China;[2]Huaqiao Univ, Sch Polit Sci & Publ Adm, Quanzhou 362021, Peoples R China;[3]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Social & Publ Adm, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[4]Lanzhou Univ, Inst Green Finance, Lanzhou 730000, Peoples R China

年份：2022

卷号：19

期号：23

外文期刊名：INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC HEALTH

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000896103300001)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000896103300001)】；

基金：This research was supported by the National Science Foundation of China (No. 72034003, 71874074, 71804063, 72004105, and 72104097), Youth Project of Gansu Natural Science Foundation (No. 22JR5RA542), General Project of Gansu Philosophy and Social Science Foundation (No. 2022YB014), Lanzhou Philosophy and Social Science Planning Project (No. 22-A42), Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (No. lzujbky-2021-sp72), and Humanity and Social Science Fund of Ministry of Education of China (No. 20JYC630049).

语种：英文

外文关键词：environmental regulation; political connections; policy effect; regulatory severity; regulatory certainty

摘要：In environmental authoritarian countries, environmental pollution control relies on government environmental regulation. Theoretically, the certainty and severity of environmental regulation are the key factors in achieving its political goals. According to regulatory space theory, an effective regulatory system needs regulatory power and resources. However, the effectiveness of regulation may be decreased by the desperate need for resources, and the regulated enterprises can also affect environmental regulation through their information advantage and social networks. This paper focuses on how local environmental regulation can be achieved under these conditions. The analysis is conducted from two perspectives: the deterrence effect of punishment and the political connections maintained by enterprises. An empirical test was conducted by analyzing the research data from the 12th China Private Enterprise Survey in 2016. The study found that the severity of punishment is a mediator of environmental regulation in the promotion of enterprises' investment in pollution control, and that it is moderated by the political relationships of enterprise managers. Compared with counterparts that have a less substantial political network, enterprises with more political networks may feel more pressure from environmental regulation policies, which leads to higher pollution fines. However, the promotion effect of environmental fines on an enterprise's investment in pollution control is weakened due to its political relationships, thus weakening the effectiveness of the punishment. This paper clarifies the mechanism through which political connections weaken the effect of environmental regulation: political connections encourage firms to avoid real harm and do false good. Regulation is supposed to use fines as an incentive to improve the environment, but politically connected companies are more willing to pay fines (doing false good), than to invest in cleaning up pollution (avoiding real harm).