文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Gaining by ceding - bounded wholesale pricing for information sharing in a supply chain

作者：Li, Tian[1,3];Zhang, Hongtao[2]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[2]Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Management, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong, Peoples R China;[3]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2023

卷号：32

期号：3

起止页码：829

外文期刊名：PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

收录：;WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000888364900001)】；

基金：ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors are grateful to the department editor, the senior editor, and two reviewers for their comments and constructive suggestions. Tian Li's research is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (72171085, 71671067, 72032001). Hongtao Zhang's research is supported by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong (16501318).

语种：英文

外文关键词：information sharing; market power; supply chain; wholesale price

摘要：The extant research on supply chain information sharing under wholesale pricing often assumes a model where the manufacturer can unilaterally set any wholesale price, and the retailer decides retail quantity or price while taking the wholesale price as given. Whereas this model may actually reflect the relative market power in some situations, its implementation misses out on certain win-win opportunities that could arise from information sharing. We propose a new wholesale pricing mechanism that promotes information sharing between a relatively weaker retailer and a more powerful manufacturer such that both parties become better off. The novel feature of the new mechanism is an extra stage of interaction, which happens before the retailer's information sharing decision: at the very outset the manufacturer and the retailer reach a contractual agreement on an upper bound which the wholesale price will not exceed if the retailer shares his information. This new, easily implementable, mechanism can be a win-win for both supply chain firms. In other words, facing market uncertainty, the manufacturer, while having the market power to dictate the wholesale price, can gain from a contractual restriction on the exercise of that power in order to induce the retailer, who is in a weaker position, to share useful demand information.