详细信息

Balance or collusion? An empirical study on ownership balance mechanism in equity private placements of Chinese listed firms  ( EI收录)  

文献类型:期刊文献

英文题名:Balance or collusion? An empirical study on ownership balance mechanism in equity private placements of Chinese listed firms

作者:Gu, Hangyu[1]; Ruan, Yongping[1]; Zheng, Kai[1]

机构:[1] Business School, East China University of Science and Technology, 130 Meilong Road, Shanghai, 200237, China

年份:2018

起止页码:980

外文期刊名:Conference Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Project Management, ISPM 2018

收录:EI(收录号:20190506445445)

语种:英文

外文关键词:Project management

摘要:We study how ownership structure affects agency problems in private placements and find evidence that the distraction of ownership structure is an effective way to reduce tunneling behaviors and protect minority shareholders in private placements. When majority shareholders subscribe securities in private placements, the offer price discount rises and more proceeds are used for capital operations. With the increase of equity balance, majority shareholders subscribe fewer securities in private placements, and even if they do subscribe, discount is lower and more funds are used for investment projects. ? Conference Proceedings of the 6th International Symposium on Project Management, ISPM 2018. All rights reserved.

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