文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：终极控制股东、超额控制与信息透明度

英文题名：Ultimate Controlling Shareholder,Excess Control and Information Transparency Evidence from Listed Companies in China

作者：王俊秋[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

年份：2009

卷号：31

期号：6

起止页码：66

中文期刊名：山西财经大学学报

外文期刊名：Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

收录：CSTPCD;;北大核心:【北大核心2008】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2008_2009】；

基金：上海市教委重点科研创新项目"新会计准则实施效果的实证检验"(09ZS62)

语种：中文

中文关键词：终极控制权;现金流量权;超额控制;信息透明度

外文关键词：ultimate voting rights; cash flow rights; excess control; information transparency

摘要：承袭La Porta等(1999)的终极控制权论,实证考察了终极控制股东的超额控制以及终极产权性质对信息透明度的影响。研究结果表明:终极控制权和现金流量权的分离增加了终极控制股东攫取控制权私利的动机和能力,并进而影响了上市公司的信息披露策略和透明度;上市公司信息透明度与终极控制股东控制权和现金流量权的分离程度显著负相关;与国有控股上市公司相比,民营上市公司终极控制权和现金流量权的分离程度更加严重,其主动提高透明度的动机更小,信息透明度更低。
Using ultimate voting rights theory, the paper empirically researches the effect of ultimate eontroUing shareholder＇s excess control and nature on the information transparency. The author finds that the separation of voting fights and cash flow rights encourages the controlling shareholder to grab the private benefit of control and further affects the information transparency. Information transparency is negative correlative with the separation of voting fights and cash flow rights. Compared with the state- owned company, non state - owned company provides less transparent information because of its more severe separation of voting rights and cash flow fights.