文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Strategic Information Sharing in Competing Channels

作者：Guo, Liang[1];Li, Tian[2];Zhang, Hongtao[1]

机构：[1]Hong Kong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business & Management, Kowloon, Hong Kong, Peoples R China;[2]E China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2014

卷号：23

期号：10

起止页码：1719

外文期刊名：PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000344352300008)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000344352300008)】；

基金：The authors thank the department editor, the senior editor, and two reviewers for their comments and constructive suggestions. The first author's research is supported in part by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong GRF 641708. The second author is the corresponding author for this study, and her research is supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China 71301050 and Shanghai Pujiang Program 13PJC022. The third author's research is supported in part by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong GRF 622107.

语种：英文

外文关键词：competition; disclosure; supply chain; strategic information sharing; channel

摘要：We investigate strategic information sharing in two competing channels. The retailer in a channel can ex post decide whether to share private demand information with his upstream manufacturer after the content of information becomes known. We find that a retailer discloses low demand and withholds high demand to induce lower wholesale prices from his manufacturer. We show that a retailer should share less information when the retail market becomes more competitive, but should disclose more information when his capability to acquire information improves. When a decentralized supply chain competes with an integrated channel, we show that firms in the supply chain benefit from the rival channel's effort to improve information capability, that the incentive for the retailer in the supply chain to improve his information capability increases with the intensity of competition and with the rival channel's information capability, and that the retailer may not want to pursue perfect information acquisition even when doing so is costless. Extensive numerical studies demonstrate that similar results also hold for two decentralized supply chains competing with each other.