文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：长三角环境协同治理的非对称效应:基于多主体与多区域的双重视角

英文题名：The Asymmetric Effect of Collaborative Environmental Governance of the Yangtze River Delta Region:Based on the Dual Perspectives of Multi-Agent and Multi-Region

作者：徐乐[1];王海霞[2];邵帅[3]

机构：[1]上海财经大学自由贸易区研究院,上海200433;[2]山东科技大学数学与系统科学学院,山东青岛266590;[3]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

年份：2023

卷号：43

期号：2

起止页码：128

中文期刊名：西安交通大学学报（社会科学版）

外文期刊名：Journal of Xi'an Jiaotong University：Social Sciences

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2020】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2023_2024】；

基金：国家社会科学基金重大项目(21ZDA084)。

语种：中文

中文关键词：环境协同治理;政府环境监管;公众环境诉求;非对称效应;长三角

外文关键词：collaborative environmental governance;government environmental supervision;public environmental appeal;asymmetric effect;the Yangtze River Delta region

摘要：探究长三角环境协同治理的非对称效应,即环境协同治理效果因环境规制的实施主体与区域不同而存在差异,对于规避环境规制的“逐底竞争”,进而规避经济绿色转型过程中的“劣币驱逐良币”现象至关重要,可为长三角高质量、一体化发展这一国家战略提供重要的政策参考。基于2009—2016年长三角地级市面板数据,采用动态空间计量模型结合系统广义矩估计方法,在多主体与多区域双重视角下,考察政府环境监管与公众环境诉求在环境协同治理过程中的非对称效应,进而利用中介效应模型对其作用机制进行识别。研究发现:(1)在多主体视角下,政府环境监管表现出显著的环境治理效应,但公众环境诉求的环境治理效应并不显著,而政府环境监管与公众环境诉求的环境协同治理效应也尚未显现,存在多主体层面的环境协同治理非对称效应;(2)在多区域视角下,依靠政府环境监管的协同治理模式在长三角大部分城市产生了积极的环境影响,但在以合肥、马鞍山为代表的安徽部分城市中并未产生积极的环境治理效果,即存在多区域层面的环境协同治理非对称效应;(3)政府环境监管与公众环境诉求能够通过增加外商直接投资降低污染排放强度,但并未通过促进绿色技术创新和产业结构升级产生积极的环境治理效应。
Exploring the asymmetric effect of collaborative environmental governance in the Yangtze River Delta(YRD)region,that is,the collaborative environmental governance effects vary with the implementary agents and regions of environmental regulations,plays an important role in avoiding the phenomena of“race to the bottom”of environmental regulations and“inferior currency crowds out good currency”in economic green transformation.This study is conducive to providing policy reference for the national strategy of high-quality and integrated development of the YRD region.Using city panel data of the YRD region from 2009 to 2016 and employing a dynamic spatial econometric model combined with the system generalized method of moments,we investigate the asymmetric effect of collaborative environmental governance induced by government environmental supervision and public environmental appeal from the multi-agent and multi-region perspectives.Furthermore,the transmission mechanisms of environmental collaborative governance are analyzed through the mediating effect model.The results show that from the multi-agent perspective,government environmental supervision and public environmental appeal exert significant and insignificant environmental governance effects,respectively.We also find an insignificant collaborative effect of government environmental supervision and public environmental appeal,showing an asymmetric effect of collaborative environmental governance at the multi-agent level.From the multi-region perspective,the collaborative governance pattern relying on government environmental regulations induces a positive environmental impact in most cities of the YRD region;however,it fails to produce a positive environmental governance effect in some cities of Anhui province,such as Hefei and Ma’anshan,indicating an asymmetric effect of collaborative environmental governance on the multi-region level.Government environmental supervision and public environmental appeal can reduce pollution emission intensity through increasing foreign direct investment,rather than promoting green technology innovation and upgrading industrial structure.