文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：监督或攫取:机构投资者治理角色的识别研究——来自中国资本市场的经验证据

英文题名：Monitor or Grabber:the Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance——An Evidence from China's Capital Market

作者：唐松莲[1];袁春生[2]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237;[2]江西师范大学财政金融学院,南昌330022

年份：2010

卷号：22

期号：8

起止页码：19

中文期刊名：管理评论

外文期刊名：Management Review

收录：CSTPCD;;国家哲学社会科学学术期刊数据库;北大核心:【北大核心2008】；CSSCI:【CSSCI2010_2011】；

基金：国家自然科学基金项目(70872073;70803010);教育部人文社科基金(06JC630021;09YJC630072)

语种：中文

中文关键词：机构投资者;公司业绩;监督;攫取

外文关键词：institutional investors; corporate performance; monitor; grabber

摘要：机构投资者的快速崛起正改变我国公司的治理结构。本文选取2004-2007年有机构投资者持股的公司为样本,考察机构投资者在公司治理中的角色。全部样本的结果显示,机构投资者持股与公司业绩正相关,机构投资者在公司治理中扮演着有效监督者角色。分组样本研究结果表明:持股较高时机构投资者能改善公司业绩,符合有效监督假说;持股较低时机构投资者对公司业绩产生负面影响,符合利益冲突假说和战略结盟假说。研究结果意味着,机构投资者在公司治理中的角色取决于其持股情况:持股高时机构投资者扮演有效监督者角色,持股低时充当利益攫取者角色。
Corporate governance structure is changing because of institutional investors＇rapid growth in China.In this paper,we study the role of institutional investors in corporate governance through examples chosen from the listed companies of which institutional investors were shareholders during the 2004 to 2007 period.The result from all samples is that institutional investors and the performance of the listed companies they invested are positively related.To be specific,institutional investors play an effective monitor role in corporate governance.The results from sub-samples further show that a company performs better when a large number of its shares are held by institutional investors,just as claimed by effective monitoring hypothesis,and performs less satisfactorily when a small number of its shares are held by institutional investors,just as claimed by the interest conflict hypothesis and strategic alliance hypothesis.The results of this paper mean that the role of institutional investors in corporate governance depends on their shareholdings：they play an effective monitor role when holding a large number of shares and play a grabber role when holding a small number of shares.