文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Joint product-service innovation in EV battery-swapping supply chains under alternative service leadership structures: Insights from the Chinese market

作者：Li, Qiuting[1];Li, Ying[1];Li, Feifan[1]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, 130 Meilong Rd, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2026

卷号：302

外文期刊名：INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PRODUCTION ECONOMICS

收录：;EI(收录号：20263421336144);Scopus(收录号：2-s2.0-105047669380);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001855400300001)】；

基金：This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 72074076) .

语种：英文

外文关键词：Battery-swapping mode; Electric vehicle supply chain; Product-service innovation; Service leadership; Cross shareholding; User time sensitivity

摘要：With the rapid diffusion of electric vehicles, battery-swapping has emerged as a replenishment alternative that converts time savings into potential market adoption. Battery-swapping represents a product-service system, whose diffusion hinges on complementary innovations between product-side compatibility and service-side capacity. As battery-swapping networks attract investment from battery suppliers, vehicle manufacturers, and third-party firms, differences in capital commitment and control over service assets bring service leadership structures to the forefront of strategic analysis. Accordingly, we investigate product-service innovation and pricing decisions under three leadership regimes, and examine equity-based coordination through cross-shareholding. To capture demand heterogeneity arising from time-based competition between charging and swapping, we develop a circular Hotelling model of a swapping supply chain comprising a battery supplier, a manufacturer, and a service provider. Our results highlight three key findings. First, higher users time value generally expands swapping adoption under decentralized leadership, but may reduce adoption when the manufacturer self-operates service, unless coordination efficiency is sufficiently high. Second, leadership advantages are stage contingent. When time advantages and differentiation are strong, regimes that better internalize cross-stage gains achieve higher innovation levels, lower effective service prices, and greater penetration; as fast charging technologies converge and substitution intensifies, performance becomes increasingly sensitive to cost efficiency and asset turnover. Third, cross-shareholding can mitigate innovation spillovers and improve both supply-chain performance and consumer welfare, but its incentive effects depend on leadership structure: under third-party leadership, innovation is inverted-U in equity intensity, whereas under supplier leadership, stronger equity alignment more consistently promotes innovation, particularly in time-sensitive markets.