文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Presenting objects for random allocation

作者：Liu, Peng[1];Xu, Sijia[2]

机构：[1]East China Normal Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2024

卷号：26

期号：4

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:001269397900001)】；

基金：National Natural Science Foundation of China, Grant/Award Number: 72003068.

语种：英文

外文关键词：efficiency; envy-free; presentation of objects; random allocation; strategy-proof

摘要：For random allocation, whether a desirable rule exists or not hinges on the domain of agents' preferences, whose formation is affected by how objects are presented. We hence propose a model studying how to present objects so that the induced preference domain allows for designing a good rule. Motivated by practices in reality, we model the objects as combinations of several attribute values and a presentation of objects concerns a choice of presenting attributes and a ranking of them. Agents are assumed to formulate their preferences in a lexicographic manner according to the given presentation. We show that the domain of preferences induced by a presentation allows for a strategy-proof, efficient, and envy-free rule if and only if the presented attributes are conditionally binary.