文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Stochastic Commitment in Repeated Games

作者：Chen, Meichen[1]; Li, Duozhe[2]; Wen, Quan[3]

机构：[1] School of Business, East China University of Science and Technology, China; [2] Department of Economics, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong; [3] Department of Economics, University of Washington, United States

年份：2025

外文期刊名：SSRN

收录：EI(收录号：20250312601)

语种：英文

外文关键词：Game theory - Nash equilibrium

摘要：We study infinitely repeated games in which players choose automata instead of stage-game actions each period to determine their continuation plays. A key innovation is the introduction of stochastic commitment; at the end of each stage, players face an exogenous probability independently of becoming irrevocably committed to their current automaton in the continuation game. We refer to the resulting equilibrium in this repeated automaton game with stochastic commitment as the stochastic commitment equilibrium (SCE). We show that the classical folk theorem no longer holds in this setting. We fully characterize the set of SCE payoffs when players are sufficiently patient and the probability of commitment is sufficiently small. We show that stochastic commitment restricts the range of equilibrium outcomes relative to standard repeated games and could even lead to a unique prediction in some games. Our framework offers new insights into how commitment frictions shape long-run strategic behaviors. ? 2025, The Authors. All rights reserved.