文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：章程反收购条款具有自治效应吗?——基于公司违规视角的研究

英文题名：Do the Anti-takeover Provisions Have Autonomous Governance Effects?Evidence from Corporate Fraud

作者：陈钦萍[1];胡志颖[2];徐灿宇[3];文雯[4]

机构：[1]福州外语外贸学院金融学院;[2]北京科技大学经济管理学院;[3]华东理工大学商学院;[4]北京联合大学管理学院

年份：2025

期号：12

起止页码：115

中文期刊名：中央财经大学学报

外文期刊名：Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics

收录：;北大核心:【北大核心2023】；

基金：国家社会科学基金一般项目“关键审计事项样板化的形成路径、驱动因素及经济后果研究”(项目编号:2025BJY105);国家自然科学基金青年项目“数字政府的赋能效应研究:基于企业投资及区域选择的视角”(项目编号:72302088)。

语种：中文

中文关键词：公司违规;章程反收购条款;掏空行为;违规倾向;违规稽查

外文关键词：Corporate fraud;Anti-takeover provisions;Tunneling behavior;Fraud propensity;Fraud detection

摘要：公司章程是公司重要的机制安排,其条款设立对于违规行为存在怎样影响尚未得到充分关注。本文以中国A股上市公司为研究样本,实证考察了章程反收购条款对公司违规行为的影响。研究发现,章程反收购条款设立提高了公司违规的概率;章程反收购条款增加了公司违规倾向、降低了违规被稽查概率。异质性分析显示:区分违规类型,章程反收购条款显著促进了信息披露违规和经营违规;区分违规处罚程度,章程反收购条款对于严重违规行为的影响更强;区分章程反收购条款类型,股东提名权股份限制对公司违规的影响最强。此外,法律环境作为重要外部治理机制,能够抑制章程反收购条款对公司违规的促进作用;作用机制显示,设立章程反收购条款会庇护大股东掏空行为增加公司未来违规的概率。本文从公司“上游”的机制设置角度,为监管机构和投资者识别和治理公司违规提供了大样本的经验证据。
As an important mechanism,how the anti-takeover provisions affect the corporate fraud has not yet received full attention.Using a sample of A-share listed firms in China,this paper examines the impact of anti-takeover provisions in the articles of association on corporate fraud.we find the anti-takeover provisions increase the probability of corporate fraud.The anti-takeover provisions increase fraud propensity and reduce fraud detection.Distinguishing the types of corporate frauds,we find the anti-takeover provisions have promoting effect on disclosure fraud and operating fraud.Distinguishing the severity of corporate frauds,anti-takeover provisions have a significant promoting effect on severe fraud.The share restrictions of shareholder nomination rights have the strongest impact on the corporate fraud.As an external governance mechanism,the legal environment effectively inhibits the promotion of anti-takeover provisions on corporate fraud.Additional mechanism analysis indicates that anti-takeover provisions increase the likelihood of violations by facilitating tunneling by major shareholders.From the perspective of upstream mechanism of firms,our paper provides empirical evidences based on a large sample for regulators and investors to identify and govern corporate fraud.