文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：A generalized Nash equilibrium game model for removing regional air pollutant

作者：Wang, Qin[1,2];Zhao, Laijun[1,3];Guo, Lei[4];Jiang, Ran[3];Zeng, Lijun[5];Xie, Yujing[6];Bo, Xin[7]

机构：[1]Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Sino US Global Logist Inst, 1954 Huashan Rd, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R China;[2]Shanghai Maritime Univ, Coll Transport & Commun, Shanghai 201306, Peoples R China;[3]Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R China;[4]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[5]Shandong Univ Sci & Technol, Coll Econ & Management, Qingdao 266590, Shandong, Peoples R China;[6]Zhejiang Univ Finance & Econ, China Inst Regulat Res, Hangzhou 310018, Peoples R China;[7]Minist Environm Protect, Appraisal Ctr Environm & Engn, Beijing 100012, Peoples R China

年份：2019

卷号：227

起止页码：522

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF CLEANER PRODUCTION

收录：;EI(收录号：20192206992032);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000470939600049)】；

基金：This research was funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 71874108, 71804097, 71373155,11771287 and 11401379), the National Social Science Foundation of China (Nos. 18AZD005 and 16ZDA048), the Chinese Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation for Young Scholars (No. 17YJCZH012), the Key Projects of Shanghai Soft Science Research Program (No. 18692106600), National Statistical Science Projects of China (No. 2016339), the Chinese Ministry of Education on the key projects of philosophy and social sciences (No. 17JZD025), the Shanghai Pujiang Program (No.14PJC060), the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities and China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (Nos. 2017M621490 and 2018M630649).

语种：英文

外文关键词：Regional air pollution; Air pollutant reduction; Generalized Nash equilibrium problem; Yangtze River Delta region

摘要：As the main air pollution control pattern used in China, the independent emission reduction (IER) model mandated that each province reduce its air pollutant independently. Under this model, provinces paid huge pollutant removal costs because they could not select the optimal pollutant removal rate based on their emission reduction capacity and their marginal cost of pollutant reduction. To overcome the ineffectiveness and high cost of the IER model, a generalized Nash equilibrium game (GNEG) model was constructed to achieve the State-set regional emission reduction target while minimizing the pollutant removal cost for each sub-region. Next, the case of Yangtze River Delta region was investigated using the GNEG model. Further, an incentive mechanism was suggested to improve the willingness of all participants. Result shows that the optimal SO2 removal solution in the GNEG model saved US$4.8 x 10(7) compared with the IER model, amounting to 3.1% of the total pollutant removal cost. Finally, a sensitivity analysis was performed to simulate the effects of changes in the State-set SO2 reduction targets and the upper and lower bounds on the optimal pollutant removal rate and the removal cost of each province. The proposed model will help policy makers develop pollutant-reduction strategies that improve the effectiveness and economic benefits of pollution control. (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier Ltd.