文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Multiagent Target-Attacker-Defender Differential Games With Anomalous Defenders Under Limited Perception

作者：Wang, Jiali[1];Ho, Daniel W. C.[2];Jin, Xin[3];Li, Fangfei[1,4];Tang, Yang[1]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Minist Educ, Key Lab Smart Mfg Energy Chem Proc, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[2]City Univ Hong Kong, Dept Math, Hong Kong, Peoples R China;[3]Fudan Univ, Res Inst Intelligent Complex Syst, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China;[4]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Math, Minist Educ, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2026

卷号：71

期号：5

起止页码：2841

外文期刊名：IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON AUTOMATIC CONTROL

收录：;WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001756811400040)】；

基金：This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 62233005, Grant U2441245, Grant 62573198, and Grant 62403141, in part by the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China, under Grant CityU 11205724 and Grant City U 11206825, in part by the National Key Laboratory of Space Intelligent Control under Grant HTKJ2024KL502004, in part by the Shanghai Aerospace Science and Technology Innovation Fund under Grant SAST2024-060, and in part by the Shanghai Institute for Mathematics and Interdisciplinary Sciences(SIMIS) under Grant SIMIS-ID-2025-SP.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Games; Vectors; Differential games; Symmetric matrices; Aerospace electronics; Symbols; State feedback; Robot sensing systems; Mathematical models; Laboratories; Anomalous defenders; differential games; limited visibility; optimal decision

摘要：This article investigates target-attacker-defender (TAD) differential games comprising an active target, multiple attackers, and defenders, including some anomalous agents within the defenders' team. First, we introduce two types of anomalous defenders, characterized by coefficients in the performance metrics, termed "greedy" and "fearful." Then, we explore two distinct scenarios: first, when the attackers possess unlimited observation capabilities while visibility limitations constrain the defenders and target, and second, when all agents are subject to imperfect information, meaning they only possess limited visibility. The interactions among agents are modeled as nonzero-sum games to analyze their optimal decision-making processes. Due to the agents' visibility constraints, a corresponding visibility network emerges during their interactions. To address this problem, we employ inverse game theory to derive Nash equilibrium strategies with adaptive state feedback for agents. Furthermore, we analyze the impact of anomalous defenders on the victory conditions and capture time of the defenders' team. Finally, we validate the effectiveness of our results through numerical simulations.