文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Equilibrium analysis of transaction modes and recycling channels in a closed-loop supply chain with an online platform

作者：Wang, Yao-Yu[1];Chen, Yi-Liang[1];Cheng, Wenchao[2];Wang, Jian-Cai[3];Tao, Feng[4]

机构：[1]Soochow Univ, Res Ctr Smarter Supply Chain, Business Sch, Suzhou, Jiangsu, Peoples R China;[2]Shanghai Univ, SILC Business Sch, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[3]Beijing Inst Technol, Sch Management & Econ, Beijing, Peoples R China;[4]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Management Sci & Engn, Shanghai, Peoples R China

年份：2023

卷号：177

外文期刊名：COMPUTERS & INDUSTRIAL ENGINEERING

收录：;EI(收录号：20230813616020);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000944170100001)】；

基金：This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Project 72071137, Project 71871024, Project 71671119 and Project 71831006; in part by the Joint Development Program of Beijing Municipal Commission of Education, the Qinglan Project of Jiangsu Province, and Jiangsu Province 333 High-level Talents Training Project.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Remanufacturing; Closed-loop supply chain; Transaction modes; Platform retailing

摘要：Due to resource shortages and environmental protection, recycling of used products and remanufacturing have attracted more attention. This paper develops a game-theoretic model to investigate a key question the supply chain members are facing: When should the platform use the agency mode instead of the traditional reselling mode, and when should the manufacturer outsource recycling activities to the platform instead of recycling by himself? The results demonstrated the following: it is better for the manufacturer to outsource the recycling activities (recycle by himself) to the platform if the platform uses the agency mode (reselling mode); for the platform, the best choice is always the agency mode no matter what the recycling channel is; as a result, the equilibrium outcome will be the case where the platform uses the agency mode while the manufacturer chooses to outsource the collection of used products to the platform. This equilibrium leads to the highest recycling ratio, but does not guarantee the supply chain members get the highest but also is not the lowest profits. This study sheds light on how the decisions of transaction modes and recycling channels interact with each other and demonstrates the impact of such interactions on the platform, the manufacturer and the consumers. Furthermore, the results can help one to identify the most appropriate transaction modes and recycling channels for the platform and the manufacturer respectively.