文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Uniform Pricing as a Barrier to Entry

作者：Feng, Hong[1];Li, Youping[2,3];Shuai, Jie[4]

机构：[1]Harbin Inst Technol Shenzhen, Sch Econ & Management, Shenzhen 518055, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, 130 Meilong Rd, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[3]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Oliver Hart Res Ctr Contracts & Governance, 130 Meilong Rd, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[4]Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Wenlan Sch Business, 182 Nanhu Ave, East Lake High Tech Dev Zone, Wuhan 430073, Peoples R China

年份：2023

卷号：71

期号：1

起止页码：176

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000964311800001)】；

基金：We wish to thank the Editor and the Associate Editor for many valuable comments and suggestions. We also thank Yongmin Chen and Kenneth Corts for helpful comments on an early version of the paper. Financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (72173135), the Ministry of Education of China (22YJC790064), and the Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universities (YRTD202208) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply.

语种：英文

外文关键词：entry; price discrimination; uniform pricing

摘要：This paper considers an entry game in which an incumbent firm operates in a number of markets and a potential entrant can enter multiple or all of the markets. While price discrimination has usually been thought of as a barrier to entry, in our model it is not and instead, charging a uniform price across the markets can discourage entry. Partial entry occurs when the two firms' products are highly substitutable. In this case, uniform pricing raises the profits of both the incumbent and the entrant but reduces consumer and total welfare relative to price discrimination.