文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Licensing Essential Patents: The Non-Discriminatory Commitment and Hold-Up

作者：Li, Youping[1];Shuai, Jie[2]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, 130 Meilong Rd, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[2]Zhongnan Univ Econ & Law, Wenlan Sch Business, 182 Nanhu Ave, Wuhan, Hubei, Peoples R China

年份：2019

卷号：67

期号：1

起止页码：37

外文期刊名：JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000478438000001)】；

基金：We wish to thank the Editor, and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments and suggestions. We also thank participants of the Huozhi Economic Workshop held at East China Normal University and seminar participants at Shandong University and Xi'an Jiaotong University for helpful comments. Financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71603083, 71603283) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply.

语种：英文

摘要：Licensors of patents essential to a standard are often required to license on reasonable and non-discriminatory (RAND) terms. Using a model with owners of essential patents and licensees who invest into standard-conforming technologies, this paper demonstrates that the non-discriminatory commitment alleviates the hold-up problem. Moreover, it improves consumer and social welfare, and promotes upstream innovation as licensing revenue is increased. In an extended model with each licensor independently choosing whether to make the commitment, all licensors voluntarily commit in the unique equilibrium.