文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Targeted advertising with R&D rivalry

作者：Li, Changying[1];Li, Youping[2,3];Zhang, Jianhu[1]

机构：[1]Shandong Univ, Sch Econ, 27 Shanda South Rd, Jinan 250100, Shandong, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, 130 Meilong Rd, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[3]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Oliver Hart Res Ctr Contracts & Governance, 130 Meilong Rd, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2023

卷号：124

起止页码：24

外文期刊名：MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES

收录：;WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:001001312800001)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001001312800001)】；

基金：We wish to thank two anonymous referees for valuable comments and suggestions. Financial support from the National Social Science Foundation of China (18ZDA078) , the Ministry of Education of China (22YJC790064) , and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71973082, 72192842) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimers apply.

语种：英文

外文关键词：Targeted advertising; Mass advertising; R& Welfare

摘要：We analyze the effect of targeted informative advertising on firms' incentive to improve product quality and the welfare implications. We find that, compared with mass advertising, targeted advertising results in (i) a decreased incentive to invest in R&D unless the cost of advertising is sufficiently low, (ii) a lower mark-up, net of product quality, being charged to consumers, and (iii) a smaller (larger) proportion of uninformed consumers when the cost of advertising is low (high). The firms may earn higher or lower profits, but consumers are usually better off due both to the lower net mark-up and to improved product-consumer match. Under certain conditions though, the negative impact of more uninformed consumers dominates and leads to reduced consumer and total welfare.(c) 2023 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.