文献类型：会议论文

英文题名：Balance or Collusion? An Empirical Study on Ownership Balance Mechanism in Equity Private Placements of Chinese Listed Firms

作者：Gu, Hangyu[1];Ruan, Yongping[1];Zheng, Kai[1]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, 130 Meilong Rd, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

会议论文集：6th International Symposium on Project Management (ISPM)

会议日期：JUL 21-23, 2018

会议地点：Chongqing Univ Posts & Telecommunicat, Chongqing, PEOPLES R CHINA

主办单位：Chongqing Univ Posts & Telecommunicat

语种：英文

外文关键词：Private placements; Discount; Use of Proceeds; Ownership structure

摘要：We study how ownership structure affects agency problems in private placements and find evidence that the distraction of ownership structure is an effective way to reduce tunneling behaviors and protect minority shareholders in private placements. When majority shareholders subscribe securities in private placements, the offer price discount rises and more proceeds are used for capital operations. With the increase of equity balance, majority shareholders subscribe fewer securities in private placements, and even if they do subscribe, discount is lower and more funds are used for investment projects.