文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Information Sharing Between Competitors With Endogenous Production Timing

作者：Li, Tian[1];Luo, Huajiang[2,3];Shang, Weixin[4]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Shanghai, Peoples R China;[2]Southwest Jiaotong Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Chengdu 610031, Peoples R China;[3]Serv Sci & Innovat Key Lab Sichuan Prov, Chengdu 610031, Peoples R China;[4]Lingnan Univ, Fac Business, Hong Kong, Peoples R China

年份：2024

卷号：33

期号：8

起止页码：1775

外文期刊名：PRODUCTION AND OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT

收录：;WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001242020000001)】；

基金：The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Tian Liis supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant No. 72171085, 72032001]. Huajiang Luo is supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant No. 72201219, 72371239]. Weixin Shang is supported by the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong [GRF Project LU13501414].

语种：英文

外文关键词：Incentive; horizontal information sharing; endogenous production timing; first-mover advantage/disadvantage; information leakage/inference

摘要：We study two competing firms' incentives for demand information sharing and their production timing strategies. One firm adopts routine timing, where her production time is fixed according to her previous product models' manufacturing time. The other firm uses strategic timing, where his production time can be strategically chosen to occur before, concurrently with, or after that of the routine-timing firm. The firms decide whether to disclose their private demand information and make quantity decisions based on the available demand information, either simultaneously or sequentially. We analyze the optimal production timing decisions for the strategic firm under different information sharing scenarios and find that a pre-emptive move is generally not optimal. We demonstrate that endogenous production timing can create incentives for information sharing and characterize the conditions under which both firms share information, one firm shares information, or neither firm shares information. Additionally, we uncover several interesting implications of information sharing under endogenous production timing: firms are more likely to share information in intensified competition, a firm may benefit from its rival's superior information capability, and the option of information sharing enhances social welfare, which may also benefit from more intense competition.