详细信息
Coordination in a composite green-product supply chain under different power structures ( SCI-EXPANDED收录 EI收录)
文献类型:期刊文献
英文题名:Coordination in a composite green-product supply chain under different power structures
作者:Lou, Gaoxiang[1];Lai, Zhixuan[1];Ma, Haicheng[1];Fan, Tijun[1]
机构:[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Business Sch, Shanghai, Peoples R China
年份:2020
卷号:120
期号:6
起止页码:1101
外文期刊名:INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT & DATA SYSTEMS
收录:;EI(收录号:20201608413993);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:000524462200001),SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000524462200001)】;
基金:This work was financially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71972070, No. 71573087 and No. 71431004), Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China.
语种:英文
外文关键词:Composite green-product; Green supply chain; Power structure; Green cost-sharing contract
摘要:Purpose The purpose of this paper is to find the optimal power structure that drives green practices in the supply chain and coordinate the costs and benefits of green practices in supply chain under different power structures. Design/methodology/approach This paper developed a supply chain of one supplier and one manufacturer, in which the supplier and the manufacturer are responsible for the "greening" of products. Then, the game theory modeling method is used to explore the influence of different power structures on green practices in the supply chain. Finally, the authors developed a green cost-sharing contract made by the leader; regarding optimal supply chain profits and green performance, the proposed contracts and the non-coordination situation are compared and tested by a numerical simulation. Findings The increase of the green practice difficulty of any member in the supply chain will not only reduce the greenness of products at that stage but will also reduce the green investment of the supply chain partner. Becoming a channel leader does not necessarily mean being more profitable than being a follower, and when the green practice difficulty of the leader is less than a certain threshold, ceding dominant power to the follower may benefit both sides. A green cost-sharing contract made by the leader is not necessarily beneficial to all enterprises. Originality/value This paper helps to better understand the role of the power relation in realizing the industry's green goals and helps decision-makers to achieve win-win cooperation by adjusting power relations and optimizing green cost-sharing contracts.
参考文献:
正在载入数据...
