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Stochastic stability analysis of evolutionary two-player games on regular graphs  ( SCI-EXPANDED收录 EI收录)  

文献类型:期刊文献

英文题名:Stochastic stability analysis of evolutionary two-player games on regular graphs

作者:Zhou, Zhao[1];Liang, Haili[2];Su, Housheng[3];Xu, Xinjian[4];Du, Wenli[1]

机构:[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Minist Educ, Key Lab Adv Control & Optimizat Chem Proc, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[2]Shanghai Univ, Sch Mechatron Engn & Automat, Key Lab Power Stn Automat Technol, Shanghai 200444, Peoples R China;[3]Huazhong Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Automat, Key Lab Minist Educ Image Proc & Intelligent Cont, Luoyu Rd 1037, Wuhan, Hubei, Peoples R China;[4]Shanghai Univ, Dept Math, Coll Sci, Shanghai 200444, Peoples R China

年份:2019

卷号:535

外文期刊名:PHYSICA A-STATISTICAL MECHANICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS

收录:;EI(收录号:20193407350832);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000498749000089)】;

基金:This work is sponsored by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos. 61703261 and 61703164, Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai, China 17ZR1445000, China Postdoctoral Science Foundation 2018M632045, junior Fellowship of CAST Advanced S&T Thinktank Program DXB-ZKQN-2017-028, and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, China (222201814042).

语种:英文

外文关键词:Evolutionary games; Prisoner's dilemma games; Snowdrift games; Stochastic stability; Regular graphs

摘要:We study evolutionary two-player games and identify stochastically stable equilibria of the network games restricted to infinite populations on regular graphs. The players update their strategies according to four different rules: birth-death, death-birth, imitation and pairwise comparison for prisoner's dilemma and snowdrift games, respectively. For two-player games on regular graphs, we show that there is a unique stochastically stable equilibrium for infinite populations. For the prisoner's dilemma game, if the benefit-to-cost ratio is larger than k + 2 (k is the degree of a regular graph), the networked game has a higher fraction of cooperators than that for a well-mixed population. For the snowdrift game, the fraction of cooperators in a regular graph would be higher than that of the well-mixed population, if the benefit-to-cost ratio is larger than 1.5. Under certain conditions, the lower graph connectivity can lead to the emergence of more cooperators. Finally, some numerical simulation examples are given to demonstrate the theoretical results. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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