文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Battery-as-a-Service: who should the battery suppliers hold shares for-manufacturer, operator, or both?

作者：Li, Feifan[1];Li, Ying[1]

机构：[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, 130 Meilong Rd, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China

年份：2025

外文期刊名：INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN OPERATIONAL RESEARCH

收录：;EI(收录号：20254719577136);WOS:【SSCI(收录号:WOS:001618263800001)，SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001618263800001)】；

基金：This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (no. 72074076).

语种：英文

外文关键词：battery electric vehicles; Battery-as-a-Service; game theory; shareholding strategy

摘要：With the rapid expansion of battery electric vehicles and the increasing demand for energy replenishment solutions, the battery-swapping model has emerged as a promising supplement to conventional charging methods, while the Battery-as-a-Service (BaaS) has also been flourishing. Given the systematic and complex nature of technological innovation in BaaS, its development relies on cooperation and coordination among stakeholders. We discuss shareholding strategies for battery suppliers (BS) within the BaaS framework. Specifically, we analyze four shareholding scenarios: BS holding stakes in the vehicle manufacturer (VM), the battery-swapping service operator (BSO), and both or neither. Stackelberg game models are employed to examine how various market configurations and different subsidies influence stakeholders' innovation decisions, pricing strategies, and overall profitability. Our findings indicate that shareholding is crucial in promoting improvements in battery endurance levels, particularly when BS holds stakes in VM. Furthermore, numerical experiments on the impact of different shareholding ratios on the improvement of battery endurance levels and the strategic choices of the stakeholders. Our results provide managerial insights for enterprises seeking to accelerate technological advancements and expand market demand through collaboration.