文献类型：期刊文献

英文题名：Contract strategies in competitive supply chains subject to inventory inaccuracy

作者：Tao, Feng[1,2];Xie, Yanhong[2];Wang, Yao-Yu[1];Lai, Fujun[3];Lai, Kin Keung[4]

机构：[1]Soochow Univ, Dongwu Business Sch, Res Ctr Smarter Supply Chain, Suzhou, Jiangsu, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Management Sci & Engn, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[3]Univ Southern Mississippi, Coll Business & Econ Dev, Hattiesburg, MS 39406 USA;[4]Shenzhen Univ, Coll Econ, Shenzhen, Peoples R China

年份：2022

卷号：309

期号：2

起止页码：641

外文期刊名：ANNALS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH

收录：;WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:000618920200002)】；

基金：The authors are very thankful to the editor and the anonymous referees for their valuable suggestions to improve the quality of this paper. This paper was supported in part by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71872064, 72071137, 71671119), in part by Shanghai Pujiang Program (18PJC025), in part by Qinglan Program of Jiangsu Province, and in part by the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (JKN022023001).

语种：英文

外文关键词：Inventory inaccuracy; Equilibrium contracting; Supply chain management; Game theory

摘要：We use a newsvendor model to investigate equilibrium contracting strategies and their impact on the members in two competing supply chains that are subject to inventory inaccuracy. The suppliers are Stackelberg leaders and can choose either a wholesale-price contract or consignment contract. As a result, we analyze three cases: the wholesale price contract case, consignment contract case, and hybrid contract case. We first analytically derive the optimal outcomes of each case and then analyze the equilibrium behaviors of suppliers and retailers under both symmetric and asymmetric settings. Our results show that the consignment contract is no longer the dominant strategy for dominant suppliers when inventory inaccuracy is considered, even though it is considered as the channel-coordinating contract format in the traditional supply chain. Specifically, in the symmetric case, the wholesale price contract is the equilibrium contracting strategy when inventory inaccuracy is below a certain threshold. In the asymmetric case, the hybrid scenario occurs when the high-cost supplier chooses the wholesale price contract, and the low-cost supplier chooses the consignment contract when inventory inaccuracy is less than a certain value. Furthermore, our results demonstrate that the threshold point of inventory inaccuracy is interrelated with the channel cost-sharing rate and level of chain-to-chain competition between supply chains.