文献类型：期刊文献

中文题名：供应商环境行政处罚与企业漂绿行为

英文题名：Suppliers'Environmental Administrative Penalties and Corporate Greenwash

作者：朱玲燕[1];李玉刚[1];潘成凯[1]

机构：[1]华东理工大学商学院,上海200237

年份：2025

卷号：39

期号：8

起止页码：85

中文期刊名：软科学

外文期刊名：Soft Science

收录：;北大核心:【北大核心2023】；

基金：教育部人文社会科学研究项目(20YJA630039)。

语种：中文

中文关键词：环境行政处罚;企业漂绿行为;商业信用;企业能见度;环境注意力

外文关键词：environmental administrative penalties;corporate greenwashing behavior;business credit;corporate visibility;environmental attention

摘要：基于2010—2021年A股上市公司和北大法宝的数据,从间接威慑效应的视角实证检验了供应商环境行政处罚对企业漂绿行为的影响。研究发现:供应商环境行政处罚显著抑制了企业漂绿行为;对于商业信用水平较高、能见度较高以及环境注意力较低的企业来说,供应商环境行政处罚对企业漂绿行为的抑制作用更显著。此外,供应商环境行政处罚主要通过负面声誉溢出和增强动态能力两种渠道抑制企业漂绿行为;供应商环境行政处罚显著抑制企业象征性行为,显著增强企业实质性行为;异质性分析发现企业市场竞争较激烈或市场地位较低时,供应商环境行政处罚对企业漂绿行为的抑制作用更显著。
Based on the data of A-share listed companies and of PKULAW from 2010 to 2021,this paper examines the impact of supplier environmental administrative penalties on corporate greenwashing behavior from the perspective of indirect deterrent effect.The results show that supplier environmental administrative penalties significantly inhibit firms'greenwash behavior;the inhibition effect of supplier environmental administrative penalties on firms'greenwash behavior is more significant for firms with higher levels of business credit,higher visibility and lower environmental attention.In addition,supplier environmental administrative penalties inhibit corporate greenwash mainly through two channels:negative reputation spillover and enhanced dynamic capabilities.Supplier environmental administrative penalties significantly inhibit symbolic behaviors and enhance substantive behaviors.Heterogeneity analysis reveals that the inhibitory effect of supplier environmental administrative penalties on corporate greenwash is more pronounced in the case of firms with more intense competition in the market or with a lower market position.