详细信息
Joint Meter Coding and Moving Target Defense for Detecting Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks in Power System State Estimation ( SCI-EXPANDED收录 EI收录)
文献类型:期刊文献
英文题名:Joint Meter Coding and Moving Target Defense for Detecting Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks in Power System State Estimation
作者:Liu, Chensheng[1,2];Tang, Yang[1];Deng, Ruilong[3];Zhou, Min[1];Du, Wenli[1]
机构:[1]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Key Lab Smart Mfg Energy Chem Proc, Minist Educ, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China;[2]East China Univ Sci & Technol, Engn Res Ctr Proc Syst Engn, Minist Educ, Shanghai 200237, Peoples R China; Zhejiang Univ, Coll Control Sci & Engn, Hangzhou 310027, Peoples R China;[3]Zhejiang Univ, Sch Cyber Sci & Technol, Hangzhou 310027, Peoples R China
年份:2024
卷号:20
期号:3
起止页码:3371
外文期刊名:IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INDUSTRIAL INFORMATICS
收录:;EI(收录号:20233714722172);WOS:【SCI-EXPANDED(收录号:WOS:001077247500001)】;
基金:The work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 62293502, Grant 62293504, and Grant 62073138, in part by Shanghai Pilot Program for Basic Research under Grant 22TQ1400100-3, and in part by Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities. The work of Ruilong Deng was supportedin part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant 62073285 and in part by the Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant LZ21F020006.
语种:英文
外文关键词:Attack detection; false data injection (FDI) attacks; meter coding (MC); moving target defense (MTD)
摘要:Enabled by the widely existed distributed flexible alternating current transmission system devices in power systems, moving target defense (MTD) has been considered as an effective way to detect stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks. However, due to the limitation of power system topology, not all stealthy FDI attacks can be detected in power system with MTD. In this article, the authors propose a joint meter coding (MC) and moving target defense (MC-MTD) method to cost-effectively improve the detection of stealthy FDI attacks through integrating MC with MTD. Detection conditions and requirements on MC-MTD are theoretically analyzed, which reveal the close coupling between MC and MTD in collaboratively detecting stealthy FDI attacks. The design of the coding matrix and the selection of encoded measurements are theoretically analyzed to integrate MC with MTD in a special case that the coding matrix is diagonal. An optimization of MC-MTD is formulated and approximately solved to improve detection effectiveness with a small defending cost. Finally, simulations are carried out on both direct and alternating current state estimations to validate the performance of MC-MTD.
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